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The major developments in products liability law over the past
three decades include the adoption of strict liability, the develop-
* George G. Allen Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Duke Univer-
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ment of the concept of a design defect, and the inclusion of inade-
quate warnings as a form of defective product design.' These
developments, however, are not unrelated because the major test
for defective designs is a strict liability concept. 2 Generally, the test
employed to determine liability for product defects is the risk-utility
test developed by Dean Wade.3
The temporal pattern of litigation and insurance premium statis-
tics highlight this test's central role with respect to the expanding
role of liability.4 In fact, the consequences for producers due to
this design defect doctrine are enormous. 5 If, for example, produ-
cers were only held liable for random manufacturing defects, then,
generally, only those randomly determined errors will generate lia-
bility claims. With a design defect test, however, the cost of all risks
associated with an entire product line can potentially be charged to
the producer. This occurs if one can demonstrate, through a risk-
utility analysis, that the product was too risky to be marketed or
should have been designed differently.6 Such a test would balance
the risks associated with the product design against the utility of that
particular design.7 In the case of a product design change, for ex-
ample, one must inquire whether the costs associated with an im-
proved and safer design are warranted given the level of risk
reduction that would be achieved."
Risk-utility analysis plays an instrumental role in three different
1. See R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 25-36 (1943) (discussing progres-
sion from doctrine of privity to concepts of strict liability and design defect in area of products
liability).
2. See Birnbaum & Wrubel, "State of the Art" and Strict Products Liability, 21 TORT & INS.
L.J. 30, 30 (1985) (stating that strict liability in tort has become prevailing law in most jurisdic-
tions for harms caused by defective products).
3. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. LJ. 825, 837-38(1973) (enumerating seven factors to be weighed in determining whether product is unrea-
sonably dangerous); J. O'REILLY, PRODUCT DEFECTS AND HAZARDS: LITIGATION AND REGULA-
TORY STRATEGIES § 411 (1987) (providing background material on risk-utility analysis).
4. See generally K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 44-100 (1986) (providing background discussion of interrelationship between pricing
of insurance and insurance risk classification).
5. See infra notes 118-73 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between de-
sign defect doctrine and producer).
6. See infra notes 111-73 and accompanying text (articulating contexts in which risk-
utility test could apply).
7. See infra notes 118-53 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of risk-utility
analysis to changes in product design); Larsen, Strict Products Liability and the Rish-Utility Test for
Design Defect: An Economic Analysis, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 2045, 2046 (1984) (stating that risk-
utility test asks whether "on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of
danger inherent in such design").
8. See infra notes 118-53 and accompanying text (demonstrating theory of risk-utility
test as it applies to product changes).
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liability contexts.9 First, courts have applied this analysis to changes
in a product's physical design by ascertaining, for example, whether
a particular safety mechanism is warranted. 10 Second, the risk-util-
ity test provides the basis for determining the need for hazard warn-
ings.I' Such warnings alter the risk by providing information to
consumers rather than by changing the product's physical attrib-
utes. The third and most controversial area in which the courts have
extended risk-utility analysis is with respect to whether the product
should be marketed at all. 12 This recent application of risk-utility
analysis marks a substantial expansion in the scope of risk-utility
analysis. 13
Unfortunately, the increased use of the risk-utility approach has
not been accompanied by a sound articulation of the procedures
that courts should follow when undertaking the analysis.' 4 Other
than a list of seven factors articulated by Dean Wade in his seminal
article, there is little available guidance as to what a risk-utility test
means.' 5 Even those seven factors, however, do not constitute a
completely developed approach to assessing design defects.16 Con-
9. See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (describing three areas where risk-utility
test is applicable).
10. See Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that in order to
show forklift manufacturer acted unreasonably, plaintiff had to establish relative risks and
costs of alternative designs); Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253, 259, 589 P.2d 896,
900 (1979) (ruling on alleged defective design of mobile homes); Byrs v. Riddell, Inc., 113
Ariz. 264, 267, 550 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1976) (applying risk-utility analysis to suit brought by
injured football player against helmet manufacturer).
11. See Watson v. Uniden Corp., 775 F.2d 1514, 1515 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming sum-
mary judgment ruling for manufacturers based on adequate warnings); Fraust v. Swift & Co.,
610 F. Supp. 711, 713 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (noting that liability cannot be imposed on seller if
user knew or should have known danger associated with product); see also O'Reilly, supra note
3, at 133 (discussing risk-utility standard and hazard warning cases); Schwartz, Proposals for
Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE LJ. 353, 396-98 (1988) (describing
functions of warnings as they relate to determination of risk level).
12. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 NJ. 169, 185,463 A.2d 298, 306 (1983) (suggesting
that risk of product may outweigh its utility, even when no evidence for alternative design is
presented); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 NJ. 152, 163, 386 A.2d 816, 821 (1978)
(concluding that risk-utility analysis can be applied to manufacturer's initial decision of
whether to market product at all).
13. See Larsen, supra note 7, at 2061-67 (criticizing O'Brien's extension of risk-utility anal-
ysis to injuries involving products with no technologically feasible alternative design). Until
O'Brien, a plaintiff had to show evidence of a defective design in order to recover for an injury
in a product liability suit. Id. at 2049.
14. See id. at 2051 (noting that although Wade's factors provide components to consider
in risk-utility analysis, these components are difficult to apply because he does not discuss
relative weight and application of factors).
15. See supra note 3 (discussing Wade's article); infra notes 23-32 (reviewing Wade's
seven factors and discussing their relevance).
16. See Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 621 n.6, 440 A.2d 1085, 1089 n.6
(1982) (observing that Wade's factors merely "rationalize what most courts do in deciding
design cases, although not all the factors are necessarily weighed nor is the risk-utility analysis
denominated as such"), aff'd, 295 Md. 285, 445 A.2d 434 (1983); see also Larsen, supra note 7,
at 2050-51 (referring to failure of factors to provide adequate framework for analysis).
1990] 575
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sequently, some critics have called for the abandonment of the risk-
utility approach, viewing the test more as a metaphor than as a pre-
cise legal doctrine that the courts can implement. 17 Indeed, the ap-
plication of a risk-utility analysis may itself be wrought with many of
the same problems of vagueness and unpredictability that this test
was intended to reduce.18 Moreover, some legal scholars also ques-
tion the appropriateness of risk-utility analysis and its use in consid-
ering whether a product is too risky to be marketed at all.' 9 This
controversy has arisen perhaps in part because of the absence of a
well-developed risk-utility theory, which has left the ultimate scope
and application of the analysis indeterminate.
These controversies represent a fundamental challenge to the
role of risk-utility analysis and the design defect doctrine. Although
there have been occasional elaborations on Wade's seven factors, 20
17. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 386-88 (referring to "risk/benefit" test as being too
difficult to apply because benefit is "impossible for either firms or juries to ascertain").
18. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681, 696
(1980).
19. See Larsen, supra note 7, at 2061 (discussing application of risk-utility analysis to deci-
sion to remove product from market).
20. See Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liabil-
ityfor Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REv. 803, 818 (1976) (proposing variation on Wade's fac-
tors). The authors propose the following four factors as a replacement for Wade's seven:
(1) The cost of injuries attributable to the condition of the product about which the
plaintiff complains - the pertinent accident costs.
(2) The incremental cost of marketing the product without the offending condition
- the manufacturer's safety cost.
(3) The loss of functional and psychological utility occasioned by the elimination of
the offending condition - the public's safety cost.
(4) The respective abilities of the manufacturer and the consumer to (a) recognize
the risks of the condition, (b) reduce such risks, and (c) absorb or insure against
such risks - the allocation of risk awareness and control between the manufac-
turer and the consumer.
Id. According to another author, the model should consist of the following 13 factors:
1. The nature of the product as a vehicle for recreation of persuasive advertising
images, and the relationship of this factor to the ability of sellers to generate
product representations in mass media;
2. The specificity of representations and other communications related to the
product;
3. The intelligence and knowledge of consumers generally and of the disappointed
consumer in particular;
4. The use of sales appeals based on specific consumer characteristics;
5. The consumer's actions during his encounter with the product, evaluated in the
context of his general knowledge and intelligence and of his actual knowledge
about the product or that which reasonably could be ascribed to him;
6. The implications of the proposed decision for public health and safety generally,
and especially for social programs that provide coverage for accidental injury
and personal disability;
7. The incentives that the proposed decision would provide to make the product
safer;
8. The cost to the producer and other sellers of acquiring the relevant information
about the crucial product characteristic and the cost of supplying it to persons in
the position of the disappointed party;
9. The availability of the relevant information about the crucial product characteris-
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minor elaborations on his theory do little to address the fundamen-
tal challenges lodged against the approach. Rather than tinkering
with this list of vaguely specified concerns, this potentially workable
and coherent doctrine requires a complete overhaul.
The focus of this Article is twofold. First, it will provide a critical
assessment of the risk-utility theory. Although the general idea of a
balancing test is worthwhile, the risk-utility approach currently in-
cludes a confused mix of pertinent concerns. 21 Second, this Article
will develop a systematic and coherent economic approach to as-
sessing design defects. Such formulation of the product defect test
will enable one to achieve the balancing originally envisioned by
Dean Wade. The approach presented in this Article, in effect, rep-
resents an economic formulation of the essential approach embod-
ied in Wade's risk-utility analysis. That is, the most pertinent defect
test is essentially a negligence test based on what the producer
should have known at the time when the product was produced.
In Part I, this Article provides a review of Wade's seven factors.
Although Wade's widely cited analysis highlights the relevant con-
cerns as well as the general approach that should be used, it does
not provide a "test" in any meaningful sense. Part II develops alter-
native risk-utility measures that could be applied in different con-
texts. This section also offers a formal description of the
components of the risk-utility analysis and an indication of which
components are relevant to different circumstances.
Part III recognizes that the risk-utility test should not be viewed as
a single test but rather as a sequence of tests that might be applied.
Accordingly, different tests from the sequence would be employed
depending on the different classes of issues. For example, in the
case of design defects involving product modifications, the risk-util-
ity test to be applied would be quite different from what one would
apply to the threshold decision of whether a product should be mar-
tic to persons in the position of the disappointed party and the cost to them of
acquiring it;
10. The effects of the proposed decision on the availability of data that bear on
consumer choice of goods and services;
11. Generally, the likely effects on prices and quantities of goods sold;
12. The costs and benefits attendant to determination of the legal issues involved,
either by private litigation or by collective social judgment;
13. The effects of the proposed decision on wealth distribution, both between sell-
ers and consumers and among sellers.
Shapo, 4 Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for
Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1370-71 (1974); see Fischer, Products Liability - The
Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339, 359 (1974) (developing multifactor model analyzing risk
spreading from points of view of consumer, manufacturer, and safety incentives).
21. See infra notes 90-114 and accompanying text (discussing concerns of risk-utility
approach).
1990]
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keted at all. Because different economic factors enter in each case,
Part III discusses the applicability of these tests to the consideration
of alternative product designs, the assessment of hazard warnings,
and the threshold decision regarding the marketability of a product.
Part IV discusses the informational requirements involved in a risk-
utility judgment and considers which institutions would be most ap-
propriate for handling these assessments.
Finally, this Article concludes that the overall approach embodied
in risk-utility analysis is a potentially sound economic and legal doc-
trine. Nevertheless, the risk-utility test as it is currently applied does
not provide a systematic or coherent framework for assessing liabil-
ity. A proper formulation of the test, which this Article sets forth,
establishes an evaluative approach that is applicable in a wide vari-
ety of products liability settings.
I. WADE'S SEVEN FACTORS FOR ASSESSING PRODUCT DEFECTS
Since the publication of Dean Wade's article, the risk-utility test
has played a central role in determining whether a producer should
be held strictly liable for accidents arising from its products.22
Wade's seven factors have played not only a dominant role in the
liability literature, but have also been adopted, with minor modifica-
tions, in court decisions.2 3 Although his seven factors do not consti-
tute a meaningful economic test, they do highlight the general
theme of the risk-utility approach. This approach recognizes the im-
portant trade-offs that are involved in designing and producing
products. 24 Achieving improvements in safety requires additional
expenditures of funds, and one must strike an appropriate balance
between these additional expenditures and the safety gains they will
produce. The interests of consumers, manufacturers, and the gen-
22. See Larsen, supra note 7, at 2046 (stating that in recent years, risk-utility test has
replaced consumer expectations test in defective design cases).
23. See, e.g., Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448,453 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that in order
to determine whether manufacturer acted unreasonably in design of forklift, court must weigh
"risks inherent in design employed and alternative designs, relative costs of both designs, and
the considerations that are taken into account in the design of forklifts); Gomulka v. Yarapai
Mach. & Auto Parts, Inc., 155 Ariz. 239, 242, 745 P.2d 986, 990 (1987) (considering factors
such as product's usefulness and desirability, availability of safe alternatives, and manufac-
turer's ability to eliminate danger in applying risk-benefit analysis to products liability claim
involving injured mechanic); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 NJ. 152, 163, 386 A.2d
816. 821 (1978) (applying risk-utility analysis to determination of whether reasonably prudent
manufacturer would have marketed product after considering hazards and utility of machine,
ease of incorporating safeguards, and likelihood that users would operate machine in safest
manner); Cremeans v. International Harvester Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 232, 235, 452 N.E.2d 1281,
1284 (1983) (stating that risk-utility analysis does not involve exclusive list of relevant factors,
but incorporates varying factors given particular facts of case at hand).
24. See Larsen, supra note 7, at 2050 (stating that risk-utility analysis serves as means of
balancing competing considerations of safer products and utility generated by products),
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eral public must be considered. 25
This doctrine has obvious advantages over other approaches, in-
cluding the consumer expectations model because that model does
not employ such a balancing test.26 The consumer expectations test
focuses on whether a product is as safe as consumers expect. 27 Nev-
ertheless, the product should not necessarily be declared "defec-
tive" even if it does not meet the consumer's expectations. That is,
because the costs of alternative designs might be substantial, con-
sumers may continue to purchase the goods, even if they are aware
of the defect.28 Thus, the costs of eliminating the defect are clearly
relevant, and the risk-utility test captures these competing
concerns.
29
In the context of the courts, this test is referred to as a risk-utility
test, a danger-utility test, or a risk-benefit test.30 Such a definitional
determination depends upon the fundamental role that possible
trade-offs entail. When the federal government makes policy, it also
applies a similar procedure known as a cost-benefit analysis. 3 ' The
nature of this test is not identical to risk-utility analysis. Under a
cost-benefit analysis, one assesses all of the benefits and costs to so-
ciety. A product passes this test if overall societal benefits exceed
costs. The risk-utility analysis involves a less formal tallying of a
25. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 NJ. 169, 183,463 A.2d 298, 305 (1983) (noting that
risk-utility analysis provides flexibility necessary to accommodate concerns of manufacturers,
consumers, and public).
26. M. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8 (1987); see Schwartz, supra note 11, at
384-85 (asserting that consumer expectations test merely focuses on whether product is as
safe as consumer would reasonably expect it to be). Consumers may, for example, expect that
a car driven into a lake will float. When cars do not perform in this way, they will fail to meet
consumers' expectations. The product, however, would not necessarily be considered defec-
tive because these expectations are unreasonable. Ultimately, one must address the overall
merits of a design change, which is the object of the risk-utility test.
27. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 384-85 (describing consumer expectations test); see also
Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to
Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 611-18 (1980) (highlighting difficulty in determining objec-
tively what ordinary consumer would reasonably expect).
28. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text (discussing dampening effect that
warning labels on products have on consumers' demand for those products).
29. See Wade, On Product "Design Defects"and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551,572-
73 (1980) (stating that jury instruction regarding whether particular claim is actionable should
emphasize that alternative design "must be feasible from standpoints of technology, cost and
usability").
30. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 11, at 386 (referring to "risk/benefit" test); Larsen,
supra note 13, at 2045 (referring to "risk/utility" test); Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products
Liability Law - A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REV. 579, 592 (1980) (referring to "dan-
ger versus utility" test).
31. See E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 134-58 (1978)
(describing cost-benefit analysis as it applies to public expenditures); see also EXECUTIVE OF-
FICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE
U.S. GOV'T, April 1, 1988-March 31, 1989, at 33-35 (1988) (explaining role of benefit-cost
analysis in federal regulatory policy).
1990] 579
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product's effects and, more importantly, is concerned primarily with
the benefits and costs for the product purchasers and the firm, and
not the effects on society at large. Benefits that reduce the trade
deficit, for example, might enter a cost-benefit test but not a risk-
utility test. The essential emphasis of focusing on trade-offs remains
the same. In sum, risk reduction is not costless and, because soci-
ety's resources are limited, ultimately some trade-offs must be
made.
A. Wade's Analysis
Wade proposes the following seven factors as significant in estab-
lishing a liability test:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to
the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character
of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it
too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in
the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in
the product and their avoidability, because of the general
public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or
of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading
the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liabil-
ity insurance.32
B. Reorganization of the Factors
Although Wade should receive credit for conceptualizing the im-
portance of making safety trade-offs and raising many relevant fac-
tors, the risk-utility test is not fully operational. Despite the merits
of his factors, Wade does not propose any definitive test. A list of
concerns is not tantamount to a liability test.
Wade's list of factors leaves us with many unanswered questions.
For instance, how is the performance of a product with respect to
the seven factors to be measured and, once measured, how are these
values to be aggregated to assess whether the product passes the
32. Wade, supra note 3, at 837.
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test? There are no formal procedures of this type. In almost all
cases, competing effects involving the various factors will be in-
volved. Under what circumstances are opposing effects offsetting?
Do all factors receive equal weight? On how many dimensions must
a product fail before it is found to be defective? The risk-utility test,
as it is currently articulated, cannot generally form the basis for de-
termining whether a producer should be liable for a product-related
injury.
The difficulties created by viewing the seven factors as a formal
test are highlighted by the disparity of the concerns that it incorpo-
rates. The factors comprise neither a checklist of pertinent consid-
erations nor a series of tests that should be undertaken. Rather,
they reflect a hybrid of both of these quite disparate sets of influ-
ences, with two factors-factors four and six-cutting across both
sets of concerns.
As summarized in Table 1, the attributes used to determine
whether a product passes a risk-utility test include: the product's
usefulness (factor one), its safety (factor two), the costs of product
change (factor four), consumer awareness of the dangers (factor
six), and risk spreading (factor seven). When assessing these dimen-
sions, one can judge the desirability of the current product relative
to the following alternatives: a product ban (factor three), alteration
of the product's characteristics (factor four), reliance on the con-
sumer to take precautions rather than altering the product (factor
five), and alteration of the product through warnings (factor six).
Even if Wade had fully articulated the factors, it would still be
illogical to combine all of the sets of influences into a single test.
Some of the factors pertain to attributes for evaluation, whereas
others pertain to tests that should be applied. One uses the attrib-
utes in the context of these different tests, as they do not represent a
set of factors with a similar function. The four tests identified in
Table 1 represent three different ways in which a product could be
found to be defective (factors three, four, and six). Additionally,
they consider the cheapest cost-avoider issue (factor five) that condi-
tions many of thejudgments regarding the relative allocation of re-
sponsibility between the consumer and producer.
C. Assessment of the First Six Factors
The first factor pertains to the utility of the product. In interpret-
ing the concept of utility, however, one must not impose one's own
notion of value on the product purchaser. The possibility of this
1990]
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TABLE 1
CATEGORIZATION OF WADE'S SEVEN FACTORS
SUMMARY ATTRIBUTES TESTS
FACTOR DESCRIPTION FOR EVALUATION FOR EVALUATION
1. Usefulness and Consumer benefit
desirability
2. Safety Risks to consumer
3. Substitute products 
- Product ban
desirability
4. Feasibility to alter Costs of product Product modification
changes desirability
5. User's ability to exercise - Cheapest cost avoider
care
6. Risk awareness, warnings Unexpected injury Warnings desirability
costs
7. Risk spreading Insurance
danger was evidenced in O'Brien v. Muskin.3 3 In O'Brien, the court
stated that "the evaluation of the utility of a product.., involves the
relative need for that product; some products are essentials, while
others are luxuries." 34 This statement highlights the fallacy that
"essentials" provide utility whereas "luxuries" do not. From an
economic standpoint, an arbitrary judgment such as this is inappro-
priate because the usefulness and desirability of a product will be
reflected in the price that consumers are willing to pay.3 5
In a democratic society, courts should not be engaged in a process
of deciding that some products are not useful or essential. Instead,
the price that consumers are willing to pay for a product is the most
appropriate measure of desirability, for it is the consumer's well-
being that a risk-utility test is intended to protect. This value, de-
rived from the consumer's total willingness to pay, will generally ex-
ceed the total amount that consumers actually pay. The resulting
difference between these prices is their net benefit from the
purchase, or the "consumer's surplus." 36
33. 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
34. O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 185, 463 A.2d 298, 306 (1983). In O'Brien, the
plaintiff sued Muskin Corp. in an attempt to recover for injuries caused by the defendant, who
was marketing an allegedly defective above-ground swimming pool. Id. at 175-76, 463 A.2d
at 301. The issue of whether the fact that the defendant pool manufacturer used a state-of-
the-art material to prevent potential injuries to consumers should be included in the risk-
utility measure raised. Id. at 182-83, 463 A.2d at 305. Eventually, the court questioned
whether a luxury product that failed the risk-utility test was appropriate to be placed in the
stream of commerce at all. Id. at 184-85, 463 A.2d at 306.
35. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 4 (3d ed. 1986) (stating that in economic
terms value is defined by willingness to pay); G. STGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 71-74 (3d ed.
1966) (discussing application of utility theory).
36. See Larsen, supra note 7, at 2054-55 (explaining concept of consumer surplus).
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The second factor, which involves the product's safety, takes into
account the frequency and severity of likely injury from the product.
It also considers the changes that can be achieved through actions
by either the manufacturer or the user. This risk-utility component
is well-specified and should clearly be central to any assessment of
the presence of a product defect.
Factor three, dealing with the availability of substitute products,
is very difficult to assess on a practical basis. The availability of sub-
stitutes is not a separate attribute for evaluation because the deter-
mination of a product's utility under factor one will have already
taken substitutes into account.3 7 In particular, factor one should be
interpreted as the utility and desirability of the product, given the
prices and availability of substitute products. Measures of consumer
willingness to pay are already conditioned on the current set of sub-
stitute products.38
The availability of substitutes, however, does highlight a form of
test that can be applied to a product. If a product was found to be
too risky to be marketed, the attractiveness of the available substi-
tutes would determine the desirability of keeping the product on the
market. In some cases, a product might be banned before a substi-
tute is even available. If, for example, freon is banned as an overly
risky refrigerant, then the prospects for technological progress lead-
ing to the development of substitute chemicals must be considered.
The fourth factor, which relates to the manufacturer's ability to
alter the product, pertains to the nature of the test being applied.
Thus, the current product may pass a risk-benefit test, but there may
be, nonetheless, alternative product designs that are superior. Has
the firm's choice across product variants been optimal? What are
the costs and benefits associated with these modifications? The is-
sue is not whether safer product alternatives are available, but
whether, from a total risk-utility perspective, the best product has
been selected. If consumers are cognizant of the risks, a competitive
market will ensure that the product mix is optimal so that courts
need not make any assessments in such instances.39
The fifth factor, which pertains to the user's ability to exercise
precautions, is clearly relevant, particularly if the user can reduce
the risk more efficiently than can the producer. Even if it is the case
that the user is the cheapest cost avoider, the firm may bear a re-
37. See id. at 2054 (relating that availability of substitutes will affect consumers' demand
for products).
38. See id.
39. See G. STGLER, supra note 35, at 215-16 (noting effect of consumer information on
amount of product differentiation).
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sponsibility to provide the information needed to motivate any pre-
cautionary behavior. Therefore, the interaction with hazard
warnings, accounted for in factor six, is of consequence, because
these warnings often alert the consumer to the risks involved with a
product.40 The costs imposed on the consumer by these precau-
tions are also of consequence. 41
The sixth factor, which deals with risk awareness, should really be
viewed as a prerequisite toward efficient market operation, either in
terms of efficient product choice or precautionary behavior. Be-
cause warnings play a potentially central role in establishing this
awareness, this factor introduces another dimension for assessing
the product's risk and utility. If consumers are fully cognizant of the
risks and purchase a product voluntarily, then the presumption
should be that the product passes a risk-utility test.42 In addition,
consumers presumably would understand the properties of substi-
tute products as well, and if these were preferable, consumers would
purchase them, and producers would provide them.
D. The Producer as Insurer
The seventh factor that Dean Wade discusses is whether it is feasi-
ble for the producer to act as the insurer for its own products. 43 By
compensating accident victims, a product could bear the expected
costs of any product-related injury.44 The producer would then
shift this cost, at least in part, to consumers of the product through
higher prices.45 Consequently, consumers buying the product
would, in effect, be simultaneously purchasing, an insurance pol-
icy.46 Although the insurance objective may be a valid ancillary ob-
40. See infra notes 131-53 and accompanying text (assessing function of hazard warnings
and discussing products that have open and obvious dangers).
41. See infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text (discussing consumers' costs in com-
plying with hazard warnings in order to use product safely).
42. With full information and no impediments to competitive markets, such as search
costs, market outcomes will be efficient. The efficiency property implies that benefits exceed
costs. For a discussion on the absence of a role for liability with fully informed consumers, see
Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure, and Product Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561
(1977).
43. Wade, supra note 3, at 837-38 (noting that feasibility may depend on manufacturer's
ability to include insurance in price of product or on ability of producer to obtain insurance
policy).
44. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 209, 447 A.2d 539, 547
(1982) (approving of producer liability on insurance theory because manufacturers and dis-
tributors can afford costs more easily than injured consumers).
45. See id. (asserting that in many cases partial price increase will allow all those who
benefit from product-producers and consumers-to help bear costs associated with prod-
uct). But see id. (recognizing that prices will have to increase across board to insure against
liability for unknown hazards).
46. See id. (suggesting that price of product include price of insurance against future
liability).
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jective in some products liability contexts, it does not establish an
appropriate general basis for liability.47
First, and most important, strict liability is not tantamount to ab-
solute liability,48 for the objective of tort law is not to make the pro-
ducer the insurer of all product-related injuries.49 If that were the
case, compensation would be divorced from causality, and tort lia-
bility would serve as a large scale social insurance program.50 Car
manufacturers, for example, would pay for all damaged cars as well
as all lost earnings and medical bills of those involved in car acci-
dents. In addition to raising the cost of cars dramatically, this ap-
proach also would severely reduce a driver's incentive to drive
cautiously. 5'
A more moderate alternative is to have the producer act as insurer
only when its product "caused" the accident.52 An economic analy-
sis of causality, however, turns on whether it is cheaper for the pro-
ducer or for the consumer to reduce the probability of an accident.
In other words, the extent to which a party "caused" the accident
depends on whether that party could have made additional efforts
or safety expenditures that were relatively more productive and eco-
nomical than the other party's efforts or expenditures. After all, a
product is not defective simply because the producer did not offer
an accident insurance policy to accompany it. If the producer were a
cheaper cost avoider and "caused" the accident, then the product
should be subjected to a risk-benefit test to determine whether or
47. If insurance alone were the objective, there would be no liability tests of any kind.
Firms would pay for all product-related injuries irrespective of the presence of a product
defect.
48. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 NJ. 169, 192-93, 200-01, 463 A.2d 298, 310-12,
314-15 (1983) (Schreibner,J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasizing that concepts of strict
liability and absolute liability are separate, and that holding that no product defect is neces-
sary to find producer liable, improperly holds producer absolutely liable); D. DOBBS, R. KEE-
TON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 610-11 (Student ed. 1984) (discussing strict
liability and explaining that liability under strict liability is not absolute).
49. See Wade, supra note 3, at 828 (using several examples to illustrate that tort law has
objective of requiring more than factual causation for liability). Wade notes, for example, that
match manufacturers are not liable for all goods destroyed by fire. Id.; see Stewart, Crisis in
Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 184, 185-86 (1987) (stating broad
objectives of tort law are compensation, deterrence, and condemnation).
50. See id. (explaining that concepts of causality and fault limit liability for torts). But see
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1521, 1525 (1987) (assert-
ing that expanded tort liability is method of insuring individuals who have neglected to or
who cannot afford to purchase insurance). Priest believes that the social insurance rationale
pervades current tort law as an expression of humanitarian values in our culture. Id. Priest
maintains that tort law has failed to achieve many of society's social insurance objectives. Id.
51. Contra Wade, supra note 3, at 826 (remarking that driver who is not deterred by po-
tential of injury to himself will not be deterred by possibility of financial loss).
52. See id. at 828 (stating that courts have traditionally limited concept of strict liability
with concepts of proximate cause and plaintiff fault: contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, and misuse).
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not the benefits of safety expenditures are below costs. If the prod-
uct passes such a test and the producer is nevertheless found liable
for the injury, then presumably the justification for doing so is based
on equity and justice rather than on a failure to strike an appropriate
risk-benefit balance.
Another problem with shifting the insurance function stems from
the fact that the courts are relatively inefficient insurers compared
with private insurers. 53 Whereas administrative costs of insurance
consume roughly twenty percent of the premium dollar,5 4 the stan-
dard contingency fee arrangement calls for a much larger stake. 55
Additionally, court actions involve long delays, a probability that the
claimant will receive no reward at all, and the likelihood that the
claim will be settled out of court for an amount less than originally
desired.5 6
A general disadvantage of having the producer act as the insurer
is a problem known as "moral hazard."5 7 That is, the producer is
53. See Priest, supra note 50, at 1553-55 (discussing lack of incentive for tort claimants to
limit medical bills, and comparing tort claimant to insurance claimant who is forced by insur-
ance company and deductible to obtain medical care only when necessary). Priest states that
tort law claims are 64% to 134% greater than claims paid through private insurance. Id, at
1556. Priest denies that greater recovery is necessarily beneficial to consumers as a group; it
is inefficient to pay claimants more than their loss because these claimants, pre-loss, would
not have paid premiums to support the possibility of a greater-than-loss recovery. Id. at 1556-
57.
54. See id. at 1560 (providing statistics that indicate between 10% and 21%7 of insurance
premiums are used for administrative costs).
55. See id. at 1556 (estimating average contingency fee at 33%). In addition, Priest esti-
mates tort law administrative costs at 53% of net plaintiff benefits. Id. at 1560.
56. See Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim Compensation and
Risk Regulation, 2 YALEJ. ON REG. 53, 68-69 (1984) (noting various problems associated with
court proceedings). The inefficiencies of the courts as insurers are particularly wel docu-
mented in the case of asbestos. See id. 67-68 (outlining inefficiencies of court system in com-
pensating asbestos victims). These inefficiencies include: 1) asbestos workers may have been
exposed to asbestos multiple times, while working for several different employers, each of
whom used several different suppliers resulting in problems proving causality; 2) the statute
of limitation on the tort action may expire before the worker's illness becomes apparent, or
before the connection between the illness and asbestos is realized; 3) the defendant may be
judgment-proof because of the high cost of previous claims against it; 4) the defendant's in-
surer may also be judgment-proof for the same reason; 5) worker's compensation laws may
bar claims of those who worked for a producer; 6) inconsistent levels of success in cases
brought; 7) inconsistent damage awards in cases brought successfully; 8) tort system may
result in multiple claims for some victims, but none for others similarly affected by asbestos,
because of factors one through seven. Id. But see Priest, supra note 50, at 1569-70 (suggesting
that asbestos may be one product that cannot be insured successfully by either insurance
companies or producers through tort law because asbestos may be too risky to produce at all).
57. See Priest, supra note 50, at 1547 (defining moral hazard as effect of existence of
insurance on level of insurance claims made by insured). In other words, the insured may
choose to avail herself of more remedy, such as medical care, because insurance will pay for it,
even though she did not purchase the insurance in order to be entitled to a higher level of
care - just the level of care she deemed adequate. Id. at 1547-48. Moral hazard can be
reduced by having the insured pay a deductible or coinsurance payment, or by putting a cap
on the amount of insurance payments the insured may receive under each policy or for each
insurable event. Id. at 1548; see K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUrING RISK 35 (1986) (explaining moral
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subject to risks it cannot calculate because it is unable to monitor
how its products are used. The producer also is unable to monitor
all of the other health-related activities in which the individual con-
sumer will engage during his or her lifetime.58 This monitoring di-
lemma is one reason why the government has established the
Consumer Product Safety Commission and other regulatory agen-
cies instead of relying simply upon the courts to handle consumer
risks.59 Even the workers' compensation system does a very poor
job in providing for effective insurance because of the complex cau-
sality problems that are involved in the case of health risks. 60 It
should also be noted, however, that the analogy to workers' com-
pensation breaks down in the consumer products context. Whereas
the employer can monitor workers at the workplace, the producer
cannot monitor the consumer's behavior.61
It is also not feasible for any organization to act as the insurer in
situations involving highly correlated risks.62 Such risks create great
difficulty because they are statistically dependent and are not accom-
panied by an offsetting risk.63 In general, the insurance industry
writes policies for uncorrelated risks and pools them in their portfo-
hazard as possibility that insured will take risks would not have been taken if she were unin-
sured); Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14J. LEG. STUD. 645, 653 (1985) (dis-
cussing examples of moral hazard).
58. See Stewart, supra note 49, at 193 (suggesting that because producers have no way to
weed out careless consumers, perhaps contributory or comparative negligence should be re-
stored, or contractual arrangements between producer and consumer should be changed to
reflect producer liability for consumer actions).
59. Viscusi, REGULATING CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 8-16 (1984) (outlining role of
courts in area of products liability and need for government intervention).
60. See Viscusi, supra note 56, at 62-65 (outlining coverage available through workers'
compensation system, and problems of system that make it inaccessible to workers). These
problems include: 1) the requirement of a medical determination that the workers' occupa-
tion caused the disease; 2) long incubation period of disease impairs causation and workers'
ability to gather evidence that disease is job-related; 3) stringent statutes of limitations that
begin running on date "accident" occurred rather than date injury was discovered; 4) incon-
sistent claim awards; 5) low average amount of awards when compared to awards in successful
product liability suits. Id.; Stewart, supra note 49, at 191-93 (discussing differences between
proving occupational and consumer injuries). See generally Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Bur-
dens of Proof Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE LJ. 376 (1986) (reviewing
complicated techniques used to prove causation in toxic tort cases).
61. See Stewart, supra note 49, at 193 (expressing that employers have degree of control
over workers that producers do no have over consumers); see also Priest, supra note 50, at
1557-58 (noting that manufacturer must sell product to all who wish to buy it without being
able to distinguish between consumers for insurance purposes).
62. See Priest, supra note 50, at 1540 (explaining that risks must be uncorrelated (i.e.
statistically independent) in order to ensure that insurer will not have too many claims to pay
from same event). For instance, all claims arising from a nuclear war would be correlated
(occur at the same time), whereas claims arising from auto accidents and from house fires
would be uncorrelated. Id.
63. Priest, supra note 50, at 1544. Insurers avoid this problem by developing a portfolio
of policies for products that have uncorrelated risks. Id.
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lio,64 so as to ensure that the average losses from year to year will be
fairly smooth and will be in line with the premiums paid.6 5 There-
fore, the insurance approach may be feasible in product defect situa-
tions that occur on an occasional basis, 66 but this approach would be
impractical where there are major insurance costs associated with an
entire product line.67
As the experience in the asbestos industry has shown us, highly
correlated risks did not lead to risk spreading but instead led to the
shutdown of the industry.68 The potential value of the asbestos-re-
lated claims exceeded not only the resources of the asbestos indus-
try but also that of their insurers.6 9 As a result, Johns-Manville, a
leading asbestos producer, was required to reorganize under Chap-
ter 11 procedures.70 It is noteworthy that in Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Products Corp. ,71 the court articulated a risk-spreading objec-
tive of products liability, even though the scale of the risk made risk-
spreading infeasible.72
Another difficulty with having the producer act as the insurer
arises with respect to health hazards involving severe causality
problems.73 In many cases, the scientific evidence is so imprecise
64. Id. Portfolios may contain either broad or narrow pools of risk. Id. at 1545. Narrow
risk pools may be attractive to the insured because the premium will more closely reflect the
individual's probability of risk. Id. For instance, separating health insurance pools of smokers
and non-smokers provides the benefit of lower premiums for non-smokers, and will attract
non-smokers to that insurer. Id. Likewise, broad insurance pools benefit the insured by al-
lowing insurance of specific and unusual risks, and by offsetting these with uncorrelated risks
of a similar level. Id. at 1544.
65. See id. at 1540 (describing how insurance companies are able to pay claims and still
stay in business); Epstein, supra note 57, at 649 (explaining how insurance industry maintains
overall financial stability).
66. See Epstein, supra note 57, at 664-65 (distinguishing traditional single-occurrence risk
from design defects that involve systemic risk).
67. Priest, supra note 50, at 1544. The reason is that the risks from a product line are
likely to be highly correlated. Id.; Epstein, supra note 57, vt 665 (using example of DES).
68. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 NJ. 191, 209, 447 A.2d 539, 547
(1982) (finding broad liability for asbestos producers). It is currently believed by some com-
mentators that asbestos may be too risky to produce. Priest, supra note 50, at 1570.
69. Viscusi, supra note 56, at 55 & n.11.
70. See id. at 53 & n.2 (citing In re Johns-Manville Corp. Nos. 82B 11, 656-76 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1982) and Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter
11 Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1983)); Viscusi, supra note 56, at 55 & n.10 (providing
statistics emphasizing magnitude of claims against asbestos producers).
71. 90 NJ. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
72. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 NJ. 191, 205-06, 447 A.2d 539, 547
(1982); see supra notes 68, 70 and accompanying text (explaining infeasibility of risk-spreading
in cases of asbestos). The Beshada court may have broadened liability because it was con-
cerned that otherwise a large number of plaintiffs would not be compensated. See Beshada, 90
N.J. at 197-98,447 A.2d at 542-43 (noting that single trial judge was assigned to hear asbestos
litigation in one county, and that Beshada, which consolidated six cases, dealt with claims of 58
plaintiffs). Beshada's application was later limited to asbestos litigation. Feldman v. Lederle
Lab., 97 NJ. 429, 454-55, 479 A.2d 374, 388 (1984).
73. See K. ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 51 (citing long latency period, difficulty in identify-
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that the extent of the linkage between the product and the risk re-
mains uncertain even on an average prospective basis. 74 After the
fact, causality becomes much more difficult to determine given the
highly varied set of activities and personal consumption habits of
individuals over their lifetimes. 75 In situations in which there are
multiple causes and long time lags, it is difficult to establish a mean-
ingful basis for assessing the appropriate insurance. 76 This uncer-
tainty may be of substantial consequence. If, for example, we were
to compensate all cases of lung cancer of asbestos workers rather
than only the expected number of cases based on current dose-re-
sponse relationships, expected insurance costs would rise by an or-
der of magnitude. 77
In these situations, the tort system is simply not an effective rem-
edy. This point has been made not only with respect to asbestos78
but also in the case of Agent Orange. 79 Society, however, is not
entirely powerless in these situations because government regula-
tion often represents a more appropriate policy alternative.80
In situations involving long time lags, a pivotal limitation of hav-
ing the producer act as the insurer is that it is not feasible to shift a
highly changing accident or illness burden. The loss spreading no-
tion is simply inappropriate in the case of producer-originated prod-
uct insurance.8 1 If there is a lag of two or three decades before the
adverse health effects become known, the charge that would be
ing specific chemicals to which plaintiff was exposed, and lack of scientific knowledge about
ability of chemicals to cause harm, as hurdles to causation); Viscusi, supra note 56, at 54
(enumerating these problems).
74. See Gold, supra note 60, at 379-80 (stating difficulty in finding definite linkage be-
tween product and disease using epidemiological population studies).
75. See Viscusi, supra note 56, at 58-59 (listing some factors that may influence health
effects of product on individuals). These factors include but are not limited to demographic/
racial group of individual, cigarette smoking, and genetic susceptibility of individual. Id.
76. See id. at 67 (noting that these factors also made proof of proximate cause extremely
onerous).
77. See id. at 74.
78. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (explaining failure of tort system to
compensate asbestos plaintiffs).
79. See generally P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE
CouRTs (1987) (discussing agent orange cases). Causation was extremely difficult to prove in
these cases. Id. at 29-30, 185-86, 268-72.
80. See Stewart, supra note 49, at 190, 195 (mentioning ways that regulation is already
used in place of tort system). These include health and safety regulations, and schemes to
provide compensation administratively or through no-fault programs. Id.; see Viscusi, Toward
a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks
to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 66, 70-71, 76-78 (1989) (discussing current and
possible future role of several regulatory agencies); see also Viscusi, supra note 56, at 60-62
(evaluating success and failure of OSHA regulations).
81. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 NJ. 191, 197, 447 A.2d 539, 547
(1982) (recognizing that spreading cost of injuries among those who produce is preferred
over spreading costs on innocent victims).
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needed to settle all past liabilities would greatly exceed the value of
the insurance to current consumers of the product.8 2 Thus, the in-
surance analogy breaks down. Even if the scale of the health risks
involved were not substantial, this huge discrepancy in the timing of
the consumption and the timing of the potential health costs under-
mines any attempt to establish a meaningful linkage between the
two.
The emergence of the risk-spreading objective within the risk-util-
ity test, in particular, and strict liability, more generally, may have
been a product of its historical context. At the time when these doc-
trines were introduced, federal social insurance efforts were not well
established. s Moreover, private health insurance coverage was not
nearly as extensive as it is today.84 With the substantial expansion
of health insurance as an employee fringe benefit, the insurance gap
that tort liability might fill is not great. Indeed, concern has shifted
to dealing with overinsurance, as individuals today may have multi-
ple forms of recovery for the same accident.8 5
A final limitation of having producers act as insurers is that, in
effect, each risk will be insured separately. From an insurance
standpoint, such coverage is less efficient than comprehensive cov-
erage.8 6 In addition, it raises the problem of overlapping coverage
and the need for complex subrogation rights to handle the overlaps
that occur.
Providing insurance may be a laudable objective but it may not be
economically desirable in many instances.8 7 The insurance objec-
tive may come into play as an additional dividend of compensating
victims of manufacturing defects provided there are a modest
number of accidents. Design defects that involve large-scale risks
and product defects that lead to deferred health risks, however, do
not provide attractive settings for utilizing product liability as an in-
82. See Schwartz, Product Liability, Corporate Structure and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the
Remote Risk Relationship, 14J. LEG. STUD. 689, 729-30 (describing how companies pay for cur-
rent liabilities for past products).
83. Priest, supra note 50, at 1586.
84. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES 1988, at
92 (1988); Priest, supra note 50, at 1552. But see Priest, supra note 50, at 1586 n.251 (noting
that as many as 35 million people may be uninsured, but that because not all people make
claims each year, only portion of those uninsured receive insufficient health care due to lack of
insurance).
85. See K. ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 141-48 (discussing methods of coordinating vari-
ous coverage which insured may have).
86. Eisner & Strotz, Flight Insurance and the Theory of Choice, 69 J. POL. ECON. 355, 363
(1961) (discussing undesirability of single risk coverage, such as flight insurance),
87. See Epstein, supra note 57, at 668-69 (advocating return to more limited rules of
product liability).
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surance mechanism.88
II. ALTERNATIVE RISK-UTILITY MEASURES
This Article will show that from an economic standpoint more
than one risk-utility test is needed because the components of the
test differ depending on the context.8 9 Table 2 summarizes three
alternative approaches that one might implement to devise mean-
ingful risk-utility measures. The main distinction between each of
these three tests is that profits to the firm are not factors in the pur-
chaser's test but they are included in the other tests. The following
sections describe the different characteristics and components of
each approach.
A. Purchaser's Risk-Utility Test
The first test is a measure of the purchaser's risk-utility. The pur-
pose of this test is simply to measure whether the average con-
sumer's expected benefit derived from a product would outweigh
his or her expected costs. 90 Disregarding the product's profitability,
this test seeks only to determine whether there is a net benefit to the
purchaser.
The informational standard used in this analysis is what the pro-
ducer should have known about the risk at the time of production.
This amount of knowledge may be more than the producer actually
had, particularly if the producer did not undertake product risk re-
search or did not monitor product-related accident reports. The
test, however, should not assume that producers had advanced
knowledge that was otherwise not available and which they could
not have acquired in the normal course of their operations. Thus,
the imposition of retroactive liability on asbestos producers, which
the court proposed in Beshada, is not consistent with the test that
this Article sets forth. 91 The issue is not whether in retrospect the
88. The large scale of risks will impose substantial product costs so that consumers will
not be willing to pay for the risk insurance through higher prices. The time lag is important
because consumers today have no economic motivation for paying the higher prices assod-
ated with products that are currently safe in order to fund the insurance costs of products that
previously involved high risks.
89. See infra notes 133-87 and accompanying text (explaining contexts in which alterna-
tive approaches would be used).
90. See Wade, supra note 3, at 834-35 (describing basic question asked in risk-utility anal-
ysis). This test is new only in terms of its implementation because it calculates the same basic
risk-utility measure introduced by Wade in his seminal article. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. LJ. 5, 17 (1965) (enumerating factors first offered by Wade).
91. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204, 447 A.2d 539, 546
(1982) (finding fact that producer could not have known consequences of asbestos irrelevant
to question of producer's liability). Courts following Beshada have, in essence, required pro-
1990]
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Consumer willingness to pay for product X X X
Profits X X
Taxes X
Benefits to other parties X
Cost Components
Purchase cost X X X
Unexpected injury cost X X X
Costs to other parties X
product should have been marketed, but instead whether a pro-
ducer making a socially oriented product risk decision, behaved in a
proper manner based on the state of knowledge at that time.92
It should also be noted that this test primarily focuses on the en-
tire class of product purchasers, not just the individual consumer
involved in a particular liability case. Some individuals will always
be unhappy with a particular product, but this test only requires
that, on average, the product's benefits will outweigh its costs. Cer-
tainly, one might envision a stringent liability criterion that requires
that every consumer reap benefits in excess of the expected costs.
Such a test, however, would only be appropriate if the producer
could in fact distinguish the merits of the product for each con-
sumer and then charge a person-specific price to reflect the differ-
ences.93 Unfortunately, such fine tuning and discriminatory pricing
ducers to know what was technologically impossible to know at the time the defective product
was manufactured. Beshada, for instance, made asbestos manufacturers liable for injuries they
had no idea would result. Short of this, however, courts have adopted a strict liability test if
the producer did not inspect for defects. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal,2d
57, 60, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963) (finding producer liable for lack of
inspections).
92. This formula is not foreign to the product liability field. See Birnbaum & Wrubel,
supra note 2, at 31 & n.3 (noting cases either using or rejecting "state of the art" defense).
Before Beshada, courts applied a "state of the art" defense in which a producer defending
against a negligence claim could argue that it was scientifically impossible to know that a
defect would occur based on the state of technology at the time of manufacture. Id. This
would immunize the defendant manufacturer from liability. Id.
93. By definition, discriminatory pricing charges each consumer his or her reservation
price. As was noted above, consumer surplus arises from the spread between the price
charged and the maximum amount consumers are willing to pay. If producers could extract
this maximum amount from each consumer, they could capture the value of the consumer's
surplus.
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is not feasible, 94 and is irrelevant to the broader, more important
question of whether a product design is appropriate for an entire
market. Class actions are therefore better suited to make such judg-
ments, although regulatory agencies with specified expertise are the
ideal forum.95
The components of the purchaser's risk-utility test appear at the
top of Table 2. The first component is the value of the product to
the consumer, or the consumer's total willingness to pay for the
product. The determination of the value is not a mystical issue that
turns on an external observer's assessment of what is valuable and
what is not. Rather, economists, utilizing a well established method-
ology for approaching this issue, ascertain the maximum amount
consumers are willing to pay for the product.96 The schedule for
this maximum willingness-to-pay value is given by the demand
curve for the product which has been estimated for many
products. 97
The next component considers the costs involved in the purchase,
one of which is the purchase price. The costs must first be sub-
tracted from the amount that consumers would be willing to pay in
order to obtain a net-willingness-to-pay figure, or as was previously
defined, the "consumer's surplus."9 8 After this computation, one
must next subtract any unexpected injury costs associated with the
product. Expected injury costs, however, are not.subtracted be-
cause they will have already been internalized through the price that
consumers are willing to pay. This latter point, developed by Adam
Smith, has found approval in a number of studies in both the labor
market as well as the product market.99
94. G. STIGLER, supra note 35, at 71-74 (explaining use of "rational consumer" in evalu-
ating utility and pricing).
95. See Viscusi, supra note 80, at 76 (positing that regulatory agencies are best forum for
forecasting risk information).
96. E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, supra note 31, at 149-51.
97. Such estimates are calculated through econometric procedures. For a discussion of
various models for evaluating economic demand curves, see S. PUDNEY, MODELLING INDIVID-
UAL CHOICE: THE ECONOMETRICS OF CORNERS, KINKS, AND HOLES (1989); P. SIMMONS, CHOICE
AND DEMAND (1974);J. CHIPMAN, PREFERENCES, UTILITY AND DEMAND (1971); H. THEIL & K.
CLEMENTS, APPLIED DEMAND ANALYSIS: RESULTS FROM SYSTEM-WIDE APPROACHES (1987).
98. G. STIGLER, supra note 35, at 78-81 (reviewing concept of consumer's surplus). Con-
sumer's surplus represents the net gain of the purchase to the consumer, excluding all antici-
pated costs associated with the product. SeeJ. STIGLrrz, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
259-60 (1988) (noting that consumer's surplus represents consumer's willingness to pay
above and beyond price). The computation would read as follows:
consumer surplus = utility-cost.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing consumer surplus calculation).
99. See, e.g., W. K. VIscusI & W. A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND
WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 83-97 (1987) [hereinafter LEARNING ABOUT
RISK] (explaining that expected risks are assumed in price paid for product); W. K. VIscusi,
RISK BY CHOICE 2, 37-38 (1983) (citing ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776) and
1990]
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In assessing the effect of unexpected costs, such as accidents or
illnesses, on the total cost, the following three-way breakdown is
helpful. First, if consumers on balance overestimate the risk associ-
ated with the product, then there are no unexpected injury costs
that must be considered. Second, if consumers have full informa-
tion, once again there are no unanticipated costs with which to be
concerned. Finally, where consumers underestimate the risks, the
unanticipated cost of the resulting injury or illness must be factored
into the analysis. The basic issue will then become whether these
unanticipated costs outweigh the consumer surplus. °00 Conse-
quently, the risk-utility measure from the standpoint of the pur-
chaser is whether the consumer's surplus exceeds the unexpected
injury costs inflicted by the product.
When deciding whether the costs outweigh the benefits, however,
any deferred impacts must be calculated through a process known as
discounting.' 0 Discounting is often applied in court cases in situa-
tions where the present value of future lost earnings for accident
victims is ascertained. 10 2 The use of discounting recognizes that a
dollar today has a higher value than a dollar in the future even if the
role of inflation is excluded.' 0 3 In terms of the risk-utility measure,
any unexpected injury costs tend to be more remote in time than the
benefits. 0 4 In the case of deferred health risks, this time lag must
noting that workers' wages internalize expected risks); W. K. Viscusi, Alternative Approaches to
Valuing the Health Impacts of Accidents: Liability Law and Prospective Evaluations, 46 LAW & CON-
rEMP. PROBS. 49, 53-58 (1983) [hereinafter Alternative Approaches] (explaining that risks are
figured into wages and prices); Oi, The Economics of Industrial Safety, 38 LAW & CONTEMp. PROBS.
669, 674-80 (1974) (stating that workers assume risks in wage premium); Oi, The Economics of
Product Safety, 4 BELLJ. ECON. & MGmT. Sci. 3, 11-14 (1973) (explaining risks assumed in price
of products). The formula for this concept would be as follows:
utility = purchase price - expected injury cost.
100. The formula for the purchaser's risk-utility test is therefore: risk - utility = con-
sumer's surplus - unexpected injury costs. Consequently, the risk-utility measure from the
standpoint of the purchaser is whether the consumer's surplus exceeds the unexpected injury
costs inflicted by it.
101. E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, supra note 31, at 159-68 (explaining discounting pro-
cess); see EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra
note 3 1, at 35-36 (discussing role of discounting and current government policies on process
of discounting). A formula for the discounting procedure would be:
present value = future value of $1 in year t is
1/(1 + r)'.
where: r = discount rate (interest rate)
t = discount period (number of years).
102. See O'Toole v. United States, 242 F.2d 308, 312 (3d Cir. 1957) (allotting damages
based on present value); see also R. POSNER, supra note 35, at 177-81 (describingjudicial use of
discounting procedures).
103. See Alternative Approaches, supra note 99, at 61-62 (explaining reason for discounting
and giving examples).
104. Cigarette smoking is a perfect example of a product from which consumers person-
ally benefit immediately, but realize the costs perhaps much later. A substantial debate fo-
cuses on whether people use a correct and consistent discount rate when valuing effects,
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be taken into account when establishing the appropriate values. If,
for example, one were to use a two percent real rate of interest
when assessing the value of a dollar thirty years hence, one would
find that the present value of the dollar in today's money is only
fifty-five cents. Unanticipated future injury costs would conse-
quently be reduced by forty five percent because of this discounting
procedure. Although other discount rates and other lag times will
produce different reductions in value, the potential importance of
discounting in contexts in which there are long time lags between
the time of purchase- and the time of injury is significant, even when
using this relatively low two percent rate of interest.10 5
B. Private Risk-Utility Test
The private risk-utility test broadens the context for analysis to
include effects on the producer, such as the producer's profits. Ex-
cept for a vague reference to feasibility in factor-four, Wade appar-
ently ignores this calculation. 10 6 If one includes profits, the overall
net benefit of the product changes to the sum of the consumers'
surplus and producers' profits, less the unexpected injury costs. 10 7
In the economics literature, the profit component is reflected in the
"producer surplus"-a concept which has been a fundamental part
of economic analysis for most of the century. 108
The private risk-utility test is therefore a twofold test. First, the
product must pass the purchaser's risk-utility test previously dis-
cussed. If the product does not pass this test, it should not be mar-
keted even if the producer accrued substantial profits from its sale.
This is the case because products should pass an initial test of mar-
ketability showing that consumers would buy the product based on
their knowledge of the risks at the time the product was produced.
Once the product passes this first test, the "threshold risk-utility
test," the court should then consider profits, which serve as the
standard measure of economic efficiency in economic analysis.1 09
particularly when risks and benefits are not simultaneous. See Viscusi & Moore, Rates of Time
Preference and Valuations of the Duration of Life, 38 J. PUB. ECON. 297 (1989).
105. Thus, the total purchaser risk-utility measure would read:
risk-utility = Consumer surplus - (unexpected injury cost) (1 + r)'
if the injury occurs t years after the product is purchased.
106. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining Wade's fourth factor).
107. The private risk-utility measure would therefore be expressed as follows:
risk utility = profits + consumer surplus - (unexpected injury cost)/(1 + rY,
108. J. ST1GLrrz, supra note 98, at 450 (explaining concept of "producer surplus" as differ-
ence between revenues and total variable costs).
109. See R. BYRNS & G. STONE, EcONOMICS 13-14 (1984) (explaining difference between
consumptive efficiency on one hand and productive efficiency on other). From the perspec-
tive of the producer, profits are the measure of productive efficiency. Id.
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The objective should be to establish the product mix and the set of
product attributes that maximizes this net surplus accruing to both
the producer and the consumer, subject to meeting the first test."10
C. Social Risk- Utility Test
The social risk-utility test extends the analysis one step further by
including any benefits and costs to parties not involved in the trans-
action."'1 The cost-benefit components, which are unique to the so-
cial risk-utility test, are listed in Table 2. The first component of the
test is the tax component, which represents a net gain to society
above the cost of producing the product. 1 2 The second factor is
the benefit to other parties, such as increased employment that
might occur due to the production of the good. Included in this
category are the benefits that society gains from risks in the form of
reduced pension and social security costs which are not fully inter-
nalized in the cost of the product. The third component is the unex-
pected costs imposed on third parties and which are not internalized
by product users. An example would be the unexpected medical
costs to third parties as a result of the purchaser using the
product. "1 3
As with the private risk-utility analysis, the consideration of social
costs and benefits depends on the passage of the previous tests.
Certain external benefits such as increased employment for a de-
pressed economic area may result from the production of certain
products, but such benefits may be irrelevant if the product fails one
of the first two tests. If a product fails an earlier test in the se-
quence, a strong performance on a social risk-utility basis may still
110. Id. at 15 (taking both consumptive and productive efficiency into account). Essen-
tially, there is a minimum threshold level of utility a product must pass in order to even be
placed in the stream of commerce. Id. at 494-95. That threshold is met when the product
maximizes both consumer surplus and producer surplus-in other words, when the product
mix and set of product attributes yield both fully beneficial and fully profitable goods. Id. at
500.
111. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 1-44 (1960) (introducing
concept of social cost in legal analysis and concluding that calculating effects of externalities
and subsequent corrective measures may be more harmful than deficiency government may
be seeking to correct); see also E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, supra note 31, at 273-84 (explain-
ing how social welfare is considered in making macroeconomic decisions).
Once we add the societal effects, the risk-utility formula appears as follows:
risk utility = profits + consumer surplus + third party benefits - third party costs - unex-
pected injury costs, where each of these components is appropriately discounted to present
value.
112. See 23 THE TOBACCO INSTrrUTE, THE TAX BURDEN ON TOBACCO iii (1988) (giving
example of benefits society reaps because tobacco industry is taxed).
113. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CON-
SEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING--A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1986) (reporting
results of research on cigarette smoke's effect on non-smoking members of society).
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not be an offsetting factor. One must remember that the fundamen-
tal purpose of product liability law is to protect the consumer, not to
advance society's broader objectives at the consumer's expense. 114
A market that is fully efficient from an economic standpoint satis-
fies each of these three tests. That is, the product is attractive to
consumers (purchaser risk-utility), and has positive private and so-
cial utility. Indeed, if the producer and the consumer fully recog-
nize all social repercussions, social welfare would be maximized by
an efficient market.
D. Comparison with a Negligence Standard
These risk-utility measures consequently function as a more
tightly specified negligence standard. In other words, they help to
determine whether the producer exercised an appropriate degree of
care for the consumer's welfare in the design of the product. Two
distinctions, however, are most salient. First, the question being
posed in a negligence case is one of fault. It asks whether the pro-
ducer had knowledge of the risk and failed to act upon this knowl-
edge in a responsible manner.115 Under a risk-utility analysis,
however, a firm need not know the risk, have "constructive knowl-
edge" of the risk, or be inflicting an intentional harm. Rather, the
issue is simply whether the product design passes a particular test of
desirability, assuming that the defendant had knowledge of the
risk. 116
A second distinction is that the insurance/risk spreading objective
does not arise under negligence. Instead, this objective is a compo-
nent of strict liability and risk-utility analysis, as Wade and others
view the approach.' 1 7 Such an objective, however, is not part of the
formulation outlined within this Article.
114. Perhaps the best forum for evaluating social costs and benefits is not in the courts,
but in regulatory agencies. Although courts often make societal assessments, regulatory
agencies have the expertise necessary to calculate the full societal implications of the sale of
defective or dangerous products. See Viscusi, supra note 80, at 75-76 (discussing present use
of administrative agencies to assess social utility).
115. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916)
(doing away with old notion that privity is necessary to find negligence in product liability and
introducing duty of care owed by producer to consumer). See generally Birnbaum, supra note
27, at 593 (providing historical survey of product liability law); Noel, Manufacturer's Liability for
Negligence, 33 TENN. L. REv. 444 (1966) (discussing negligence standard in product liability).
116. See Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 881 (Ariz. 1985) (noting that test is
"whether a reasonable manufacturer would continue to market his products in the same con-
dition as he sold it to the plaintiff with knowledge of the potential dangerous consequences
the trial just revealed," quoting Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), af'd,
474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973)); see also Wade, supra note 3, at 850 (discussing negligence and
strict liability and concluding that whether one calls producer's liability negligence per se or
strict liability is of no consequence).
117. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing Wade's article).
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III. THREE LIABILITY CONTEXTS OF RISK-UTILITY ANALYSIS
A. Product Design Defect Tests: Toward Recognition of the Producer
Risk-utility analysis has played its most important role in product
defect cases. 1 8 In these cases, it is applied primarily with respect to
the engineering aspects of a product's design. 19 For example, liti-
gation involving Honda motorcyles has used the test to determine
whether the installation of crash bars should have been required. 120
In addition to such engineering cases, risk-utility analysis has been
applied to issues as diverse as the formulation of pharmaceutical
products12' and the characteristics of construction materials.' 22
One concern that has not been adequately acknowledged as a le-
gitimate component of risk-utility analysis is that of a producer's
profits. The cost to the producer is an essential element of the cost-
benefit analysis regarding a design change. Recognition of these
costs must, therefore, go beyond Wade's fourth factor which only
captures those costs that would make the product too expensive for
the consumer.' 23 Costs that are not fully transmitted to consumers
also enter into the analysis.
1. Application of the product defect test
Consider the situation in which there is a product defect and in
which an injury to the consumer may result. In that situation, we
can exclude from consideration the social risk-utility test indicated
in Table 2. The issue at stake here is whether the current version of
the product has a higher overall performance on a risk-utility basis
than does a safer alternative design. Alternative designs, however,
should not be required if, instead, additional precautions by the
product user would be more attractive on a risk-utility basis. In that
situation, the main cost would not be a production cost to the pro-
118. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 NJ. 169, 181-84, 463 A.2d 298, 304-06 (1983) (dis-
cussing use of risk-utility analysis in product defect cases).
119. See id. at 184-85, 463 A.2d at 306 (applying risk-utility analysis to decide whether
dimensions and slipperiness of pool made pool design defective).
120. Comacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 901
(1988).
121. See Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 97 NJ. 429, 444-46, 479 A.2d 374, 382-83 (1984) (ac-
knowledging that risk-utility analysis could be appropriate in some pharmaceutical products
cases).
122. See O'Brien, 94 NJ. at 184-85, 463 A.2d at 306 (applying risk-utility discussion to
determine whether surface material was appropriate for pool). See generally Barker v. Lull Eng.
Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (discussing liability of manufac-
turer of high-lift loader).
123. See Wade, supra note 3, at 837 (offering list of factors to include in analysis of whether
product is unreasonably dangerous). This factor excludes consideration of a decrease in the
producer's profits.
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ducer, but rather the cost of precaution-taking to the consumer. For
purposes of subsequent discussion, this Article will assume that the
most attractive policy alternative is not to rely upon user precau-
tions. Instead, the possible role of the individual will appear in the
section discussing hazard warnings 124 because that is an additional
form of design change that is often subject to a risk-utility test.
In analyzing the desirability of a design change, the question then
becomes whether the purchaser's risk-utility value is the pertinent
test criterion. As previously stated, the difference between the two
tests is that only the latter takes corporate profits into account,
whereas the former does not.1 25 The literature and court decisions
on risk-utility analysis recognize a potential role of the producer,
but this recognition is not fully adequate.1 26 Although factor four
indicates that the feasibility of the product design change is an issue,
the cost considerations that enter into the analysis are those that
would make the product "too expensive."' 127 Although most indi-
viduals would probably interpret this concern as the expense of the
product to the consumer, the costs of production that are not fully
transmitted to the consumer are also relevant to the overall eco-
nomic impact. Consequently, the appropriate risk-utility measure is
the producer's risk-utility test.
2. An example
The following example demonstrates why this emphasis is appro-
priate. Consider two possible design changes for a product. Under
the first design change, all of the costs associated with the improved
safety are on a per-unit basis for the product. One will achieve
safety level R, at a cost of an additional $2.00 per unit. Costs are
fully shifted to consumers because the price of a product in a com-
petitive market will be governed by its marginal costs. 128 This
change will boost the product price by $2.00, and, in effect, consum-
ers will be paying for the full cost of the safety improvement.
Under a second design change, suppose a somewhat lower risk
level - R - E (where E is arbitrarily small) - can be achieved for a
cost per unit of $1.99 plus an additional cost of retooling of
$1,000,000 of fixed costs. If only 100 units of the product are pro-
124. See supra notes 131-53 and accompanying text (discussing application of risk-utility
test to consideration of hazard warnings).
125. See supra notes 90-110 and accompanying text (defining producer's risk-utility value
and purchaser's risk-utility value).
126. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacy of Wade's inclusion
of producer's interests).
127. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
128. G. STIGLER, supra note 35, at 179.
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duced each year, the cost per unit for greater safety is $1,001.99.
The second policy option produces only a negligibly smaller risk
level than does the first option. Price will reflect marginal costs of
safety ($1.99), not the fixed costs. 129 The product's cost to consum-
ers is a penny per item less, and if one were to exclude the cost to
producers, then the second option would be preferable. If one rec-
ognizes, however, as should be the case, the producer's fixed cost of
$1,000,000 for retooling, then the ranking on risk-utility grounds is
reversed.
3. The components of a design defect test
The overall test for the desirability of a product change is the total
benefits and costs to both the producer and the consumer. Accord-
ingly, the risk-utility test must accomplish that which a perfect eco-
nomic market would accomplish if it was in existence. Such a
perfect market would include the cost to both parties, not simply
those costs that can be transmitted to consumers through higher
prices. Thus, in terms of the appropriate tests for design defects, it
is the private risk-utility measure that must prevail.
To calculate the desirability of a product change, one must con-
sider the economic impact of the improved design on each compo-
nent of the analysis. The first benefit component is the consumer's
willingness to pay for the product. The major impact here is that
the improved safety of the product that accompanies the improved
product design will increase the value that consumers attach to the
good. Thus, the consumers' willingness-to-pay value rises. One
must assess this net increment in consumers' willingness to pay
when evaluating the desirability of the design change because this
net increment comprises a main benefit component. Likewise, if
safety increases, the unexpected injury cost to the consumer will de-
cline. A decrease in this particular cost component, however, will
not affect the amount consumers are willing to pay because it is un-
expected anyway.13o
Another pertinent component is the profit to the producer, which
will decrease to the extent the producer can shift the cost of the
design change to consumers. The proposed design changes neces-
sarily will impose some additional cost on the producer, or at best
be cost-neutral, because the producer chose not to introduce the
design change on its own initiative. Indeed, if that form of product
129. Id. at 179-80.
130. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text (discussing unexpected injury cost to
consumer).
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modification would have boosted profits, the firm would have intro-
duced the change. Thus, any net drop in profits to the producer
must be taken into account when assessing the attractiveness of the
design change.
The last pertinent aspect is the cost of the product to the pur-
chaser of the goods. As the previous example illustrated, the prod-
uct price will rise to the extent that the marginal cost of producing
the product has risen. Therefore, the consumer will bear at least
some of the cost of the safer design through the added purchase
price.
Thus, in terms of the factors that have changed, only two compo-
nents present the beneficial effects of the design modification.
These components include the added willingness of consumers to
pay for the newly designed product, and the lower unexpected in-
jury costs to consumers. Consequently, one must balance these
positive aspects of the design change against the negative impact on
the profitability of the producer and the cost of the product to con-
sumers. If, on balance, these positive aspects outweigh the costs as-
sociated with the design change, then the current version of the
product does not pass the risk-utility test, and the producer should
be found liable for having a defective product design.
B. Assessment of Hazard Warnings
The informational issues that arise in the context of hazard warn-
ings are present in all product defect cases.1 31 For instance, there
must be an implicit assumption that either consumers were not fully
informed of the product's risk or that their behavior in response to
the warning was not fully rational.' 32 Otherwise, market outcomes
with regard to the product would have been efficient, and the so-
131. Informational issues arise with the judicially imposed duty to warn users of the dan-
gers inherent in a product. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388(c) (1977) (imposing
liability for failing to warn users); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977) (imposing
duty to warn users of risks of product); see also Outlaw v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 770
F.2d 1012, 1014 (11th Cir. 1985) (reasoning that Alabama law imposes duty on manufacturer
to "acquaint the user with the danger" of using product); Patch v. Stanley Works, 448 F.2d
483, 489-90 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding failure to warn of potential dangers gives rise to strict
liability); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 428 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that there is
no duty to warn for unforeseeable injury); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J.
191, 204-08, 447 A.2d 539, 546-49 (1982) (stating that strict liability may be found even in
cases where danger is unknown, so that inability to communicate risks is not at issue). In
addition, the courts have imposed a duty on the manufacturer not only to provide hazard
warnings, but to discover latent defects as well. See Brocklesby v. Jeppesen & Co., 767 F.2d
1288, 1297 (9th Cir.) (holding defendant liable for failing to detect defect in product), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 882 (1985).
132. See LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supra note 99, at 125-26 (arguing that information con-
cerning product risks alters consumer behavior with regard to that product).
6011990]
HeinOnline  -- 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 601 1989-1990
602 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:573
cially optimal level of safety would have been provided to the con-
sumers. An inadequacy in information is a frequently cited source
of market failure in the context of product safety regulation. 1 "s
Therefore, in these contexts, producers should rely upon hazard
warnings because these warnings address the source of the inade-
quacy directly rather than superimposing constraints on a market
with respect to product design.134
In situations in which there is an inadequacy in consumer infor-
mation, hazard warnings can potentially fill this void by apprising
consumers of the risks posed by a product and any precautions that
are necessary to reduce these risks.13 5 Some hazard warnings, how-
ever, include no precautionary information, and instead are in-
tended solely to advise consumers whether to purchase and use a
product. 3 6 In other contexts, the emphasis is upon informing the
consumer of steps that can be taken to reduce the risks associated
with a product. 3 7
Although one can assume that fully informed and rational con-
sumers will generate efficient levels of product safety that would
necessarily pass a risk-utility test, one cannot generally assume that
firms will always provide the information needed for consumers to
reach this position. The main barrier to providing risk information
may not be the costs associated with the transmission of this infor-
mation, such as the cost of putting labels on containers, but rather
the concern that warnings may dampen the consumer's demand.' 38
It is often noted that "safety doesn't sell" and that alerting consum-
133. See id. at 1 (noting information is central to economic performance); see also Schwartz,
supra note 11, at 374 (discussing effects of consumer optimism on demands for consumer
insurance); Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV. EcON.
STUD. 561, 561-62 (1977) (noting consumer misperceptions providing rationale for interven-
tion into market).
134. See LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supra note 99, at 1 (indicating that warning labels are pri-
mary method of conveying information about risks). This Article uses efficient market out-
comes to denote the "clearing" of the market, or the production level at which the price paid
for the product will equal the utility derived by the consumer.
135. See id. at 2 (noting role of providing information is to influence behavior of individu-
als). Not only must the information be provided to affect consumer behavior, but it must also
be provided in the proper format. See Bettman & Kakkar, Effects of Information Presentation For-
mat on Consumer Information Acquisition Strategies, 3 J. CONSUMER RES. 233, 233-40 (1977)
(describing how format of warnings can affect behavior).
136. Viscusi, Predicting the Effects of Food Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers, 43 FooD DRUG.
Cosm. LJ. 283, 285-86 (1988) (describing effect of California labeling law of carcinogens and
explaining that no precautions other than abstinence would be effective to reduce risks of
using products).
137. Id. at 285 (discussing results of study which demonstrates improved warning labels
will increase usage of precautions to minimize risks of products). An efficient consumer
would, supposedly, recognize the risks as set out in the hazard warnings and factor these risks
into their utility equation when making the purchase decision.
138. LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supra note 99, at 96.
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ers about a product's risk is likely to depress the demand for it.' a9
In order to evaluate whether a producer should provide a hazard
warning, one can implement exactly the same procedure as was un-
dertaken in the case of design defects. 140 After all, a hazard warning
is simply another alteration in the product design, much like a
punch-press guard or a firewall in a car. 141 Thus, the producer's
risk-utility test represents the appropriate standard ofjudgment, not
the purchaser's risk-utility measure.142
Nevertheless, the components of the analysis are assessed in a
somewhat different fashion than in the case of product design
changes. In the context of hazard warnings, the main mechanism by
which the safety benefits are achieved is through precautionary be-
havior by the consumer.' 43 In a product design context, however,
this safety is achieved through additional production costs of the
product.
To determine the consequences of providing a hazard warning,
one must again consider the components of the producer's risk-util-
ity analysis. First, consumer willingness to pay for the product may
decrease due to the recognition that there are more hazards associ-
ated with the product than originally believed. 144 In addition, the
139. Id. Note that the manufacturer can affect consumer demand by making the warning
label visible and thus making the consumer increasingly aware of the possible risks or dangers
involved when using the product. Id. In fact, once consumers are apprised of the risks, they
may overestimate the probability of the potential injury. Id.; see Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 243, 263-74 (1979) (providing
over-reaction hypothesis that discusses effects of warnings concerning major injuries and how
consumers overweigh probabilities of these injuries). But see H. KUNREUTHER, R. GINSBERG, L.
MILLER, P. SAGI, P. SLovic, B. BARKIN & N. KATz, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC
POLICY LESSONS 1-4 (1978) (arguing catastrophic events with low probabilities are discounted
by consumers).
140. See supra notes 118-29 and accompanying text (describing private risk-utility measure
which applies to product defects).
141. In fact, the courts have considered an inherently dangerous product without a warn-
ing defective for the purposes of tort law. See Rhodes v. Interstate Battery Sys., 722 F.2d
1517, 1521, reh'g denied, 727 F.2d 1116 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding "dangerous product without
warning defective," and, thus equating absence of hazard warning with defect). See also Dartez
v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 469 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Prods., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (using risk-utility
analysis to establish strict liability and finding warnings still necessary)); Carter v. Massey-
Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting product can be defective for failure
to warn); Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 871, 218 S.E.2d 580, 582 (1975) (declar-
ing that product without adequate warning is defective).
142. In other words, one must take into account the producer's profits on the benefits side
of the equation, while the costs remain the same. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying
text (describing private risk-utility measure).
143. Thus, there is a duty imposed on the consumer, not the producer, to utilize, in a
rational manner, the hazard warnings provided by the producer. See Rhodes v. Interstate
Battery Sys., 722 F.2d 1517, 1520 (11 th Cir.) (noting recovery is not barred for plaintiff who
failed to read warning if producer did not communicate warning effectively), reh'g denied, 727
F.2d 116 (1984).
144. This correlates with the first part of the design defect test, which postulates that
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costs associated with taking the precautions may also lower con-
sumer willingness to pay.' 45 A factor that is likely to partially offset
this reduced demand is that consumers may assign a positive value
to knowing which precautions to take with a product.146 The second
component, concerning the producer's profits, will also decrease,
both because of the direct costs associated with hazard warnings as
well as the potential decline in consumer demand for the prod-
uct. 147 The third component, which is the purchase cost however
will increase, as the price of the product rises to reflect the added
cost of the warnings. 148 Finally, the unexpected injury costs should
decline for two reasons.' 49 First, to the extent that consumers are
now aware of the product risks, these risks will affect the value con-
sumers are willing to pay for the product. 150 Second, if consumers
are given information that enables them to take precautions that will
reduce the risks, the overall risk level and the unexpected injury
costs should also decline.' 5 '
Nevertheless, the details of the calculation often will prove to be
superfluous in hazard warning cases. If consumers fully understand
the risk as the result of an effective warning, then one need not per-
form a risk-utility test because the market will have already under-
improved safety will increase the price that the consumer is willing to pay for the product, or
the perception of risk will lower demand directly. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying
text (discussing consumer willingness to pay); see also E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY T"iE
BOOK: THE PROBLEMS OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 243-44 (1982) (arguing marginal
demand can affect producers greatly due to changes in information provided to consumers).
This is particularly true if consumers will pay for safety features or are made aware of risks
they consider "worthwhile." Schwartz, supra note 11, at 367-68.
145. For example, the consumer must factor into the decision of whether to purchase
drain opener the cost of purchasing rubber gloves if they wish to use the product in a safe
manner.
146. Thus the total cost of the label would be: Perceived Benefit = Utility - Perceived
Threat + Value of Known Risks.
147. This component is the second part of the private risk-utility measure, which exam-
ines the profits of the firm and the ability of the firm to pass on the design costs to the con-
sumer. See supra notes 106-32 and accompanying text (describing components of private risk-
utility measure). This correlates to the previous component's drop in demand. Because both
components are negative, the total profit effect should be negative.
148. This part is the third component of the private risk-utility measure, which states that
some of the cost will be included in marginal production costs, which will have to be passed
on to the purchaser, thus increasing the cost of the product. See supra notes 106-32 and ac-
companying text (delineating components of private risk-utility measure).
149. This is the fourth part of the private risk-utility measure, which postulates that the
design changes will reduce unexpected costs by reducing unexpected injuries resulting from
the product. See supra notes 106-32 and accompanying text (describing private risk-utility
measure).
150. See LEARNING ABotrr RISK, supra note 99, at 127 (explaining that prior empirical anal-
ysis has demonstrated "high rate of tradeoff between dollars and risk").
151. This statement relies upon the assumption that consumers will follow the warnings;
nevertheless, the courts impose a duty on the consumer to use the product consistent with
warnings provided. See Peck v. Ford Motor Co., 603 F.2d 1240, 1247-48 (7th Cir. 1979) (stat-
ing that manufacturer is only liable for damages when product is used in foreseeable manner).
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taken it. 152 The effects of the marketplace will also reflect the value
of possible design changes. That is, if consumer expectations follow
the true risk levels, then consumer demand patterns will generate
appropriate safety incentives for producers. In particular, consumer
choices will fully reflect the product's risks and benefits.153
Consequently, one can view the risk-utility test for a product as
consisting of two stages. If the warning is effective, then the prod-
uct necessarily passes a risk-utility test because all risk-related costs
will be internalized. Only if a warning is not fully informative must
one undertake a risk-utility test for either warnings or, more gener-
ally, for design defects. In the latter case, the product will pass the
risk-utility test only if both the producer's and consumer's utility are
positive.
C. Threshold Decision of Marketability
The most controversial aspect of risk-utility analysis has been its
extension by the court in O'Brien v. Muskin to the threshold decision
of whether a product should be marketed at all.' 54 Traditionally,
the focus of risk-utility analysis has been on design defects and on
hazard warnings. 155 In those cases, the concern is with possible
changes in a product's attributes, but not with the more fundamen-
tal concern as to whether a product is too risky to even be marketed.
In O'Brien, the New Jersey Supreme Court indicated that it is appro-
priate to apply risk-utility analysis to address this latter concern.'5 6
These types of categorical applications of risk-utility analysis have
152. This is akin to net consumer surplus without any unexpected injury costs. See supra
notes 98-100 and accompanying text (describing reduction of risk-utility measure to con-
sumer surplus).
153. See Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S LJ. 30, 37-39
(1973) (describing how every product has some benefits and some risks, and how this assump-
tion underlies all risk-utility tests). The courts have utilized this test as well. See, e.g., Hull v.
Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (using risk-utility analysis to account for
dangers); Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes Inc., 697 F.2d 1192, 1197 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying
risk-utility and knowable designs for definition of unreasonably dangerous products); Raney
v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932, 935 (8th Cir. 1976) (listing relevant factors about knowable
risks in using risk-utility analysis); Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1347 (C.D.
Cal. 1987) (using risk-utility analysis for knowable risks only).
154. O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 NJ. 169, 184-85, 463 A.2d 298, 306 (1983) (deciding
whether defective swimming pool should have even been marketed).
155. See Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that
any case which concerns design defect must employ risk-utility analysis). The defect analysis
applies to warnings as well as defects because courts have held that the lack of a warning is a
"defect." Kay v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 1370, 1372 (9th Cir. 1977) (deciding that lack
of warning indicates product defect); see supra note 141 and accompanying text (noting that
absence of warning label makes product defective).
156. O'Brien, 94 NJ. at 184, 463 A.2d at 306; see Larsen, supra note 7, at 2045 (arguing
O'Brien court's extension of risk-utility test should be rejected).
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been increasing in recent years. 157
The appropriate risk-utility measure that one should use in this
context is different from the measure used in the other contexts.
Rather than being concerned with the manipulation of a product,
one must consider the threshold decision of whether to place the
product in the stream of commerce. Therefore, attention can be
restricted to the purchaser's risk-utility measure, in contrast to the
other two contexts where the private risk-utility measure was
appropriate.
This threshold test is really a consumer protection standard. Pro-
ducers need not be protected through a separate test, for if they are
losing money on the sales of a product, they can voluntarily choose
not to market it. Alternatively, if producers are making substantial
profits, but consumer well-being is diminished as a result of unantic-
ipated risks, then the producers should not be permitted to reap
such profits at the consumers' expense. Unless a product passes the
minimal threshold of promoting consumers' overall interests, it
should not be marketed. Only when considering additional changes
in the product must one calculate the producer's profits subject to
the constraint that the product not make consumers worse off.
The components of the purchaser's risk-utility measure represent
a subset of those discussed for product modifications and warn-
ings. 58 Therefore, one must consider only the unexpected injury
cost, the willingness of consumers to pay for the product, and the
purchase price. 159 If consumers receive full information regarding
the risks, incur no unexpected injury costs, and subsequently
purchase the product, one can reason that, on balance, their welfare
is being enhanced.160 Thus, this basic principle of "revealed prefer-
ence,"' 16 1 requires no formal risk-utility analysis.
Because of this principle, courts and legal scholars generally have
declined to deem "defective," those products whose risks are well-
known. 162 Thus, liquor and alcohol, which have common and obvi-
ous dangers, require no risk-utility analysis to determine whether
157. 16 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 214 (Mar. 4, 1988) (discussing applica-
tion of risk-utility analysis to product liability cases).
158. See supra section III(A)(3) (discussing components of design defect test).
159. This analysis omits the profits of the firm. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying
text (indicating components of purchaser's risk utility test).
160. If the product is being purchased, consumers must be gaining some benefits if they
are acting as utility maximizers, or, in fact, there must be a consumer surplus (benefit to
consumer - costs).
161. G. STIGLER, supra note 35, at 68-70 (discussing revealed preference). Even Stigler,
however, recognized that to use "revealed preference" without realizing the inherent utility
choices that are present would be a falsity. Id. at 68.
162. See Wade, supra note 3, at 842 (explaining that either warning accompanying product
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they should be marketed.163 Similarly, courts recognize the danger
of handguns but decline to apply the risk-utility analysis to cases
involving those items. 1 4 Finally, tobacco is also a product that
poses well-known risks. As the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
observes, the extent to which one assesses whether tobacco has a
product defect will be with respect to whether the product is "good"
tobacco or whether the product has been tainted in some man-
ner.1 65 In the absence of such a defect, tobacco would pass a risk-
utility test because of the well-known nature of the risks. 166 Thus,
risk-utility analysis plays a more helpful role, from the standpoint of
the threshold marketing decision, when the risks are not well
known. 167
or public knowledge of apparent danger may be enough to characterize product as safe); infra
note 163 (providing additional support).
163. Wade, supra note 3, at 842; see Keeton, Products Liability-Current Developments, 40 TEx.
L. REV. 193, 210 (1961) (noting risk-utility test is inappropriate where dangers are "open and
obvious"). Dean Keeton argues that open and obvious dangers differ from defects in that the
reasonable man would continue to market the product although fully aware of the dangers.
Keeton, supra, at 210.
The courts also have approved of this theory. See Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189,
192 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejecting contention that there is duty to warn by alcoholic beverage
producers because duty to warn not applicable when dangers are obvious); Abernathey v.
Schenley Indus., 556 F.2d 242, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1977) (rejecting contention that failure to
warn consumers of open and obvious dangers of alcohol consumption constitutes violation of
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 343 & 351 (1982) (listing acts or omissions
that constitute violations of Act)).
The government, however, currently requires alcoholic manufacturers to label alcoholic
beverages of the dangers. See Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, Title VIII, Pub. L.
100-690, 102 Stat. 481 (1988).
164. See Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1211 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (stat-
ing that risk-utility test does not apply to handguns which are not defective); see also Martin v.
Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting sales of non-
defective handguns does not give rise to strict liability); Mavilia v. Steoger Indus., 574 F.
Supp. 107, 111 (D. Mass. 1983) (holding gun is not inherently defective simply because using
it can cause death); Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 198 (E.D. La. 1983)
(indicating that marketing handguns is not unreasonably dangerous activity). See generally
Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1912, 1917 (1984) (arguing inappropri-
ateness of risk-utility analysis to handgun liability cases).
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1977); see Ross v. Philip Mor-
ris, Ltd., 328 F.2d 3, 8-13 (8th Cir.) (discussing consumer expectations and product modifica-
tions), modifying, 164 F. Supp. 683 (1964); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d
292, 296-98 (3d Cir. 1961) (discussing warranty for fitness of use of cigarettes).
166. The current law for labeling cigarettes is the Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertis-
ing Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1341 (1988)). The Surgeon General has published numerous reports concerning the dangers
of cigarette smoking. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS-A REPORT TO
THE SURGEON GENERAL (1989) (discussing progress in effort to reduce smoking-related dis-
eases); UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSE-
QUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1988)
(declaring nicotine contained in cigarettes as addictive as heroin); UNrrD STATES DEPART-
MENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOK-
ING - A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1986) (reporting results of research concerning
third party smokers).
167. Pharmaceutical products present an excellent case where one must assess possible
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One might question whether any product that is not found to be
defective despite the absence of a warning should, as a result, be
exempted from the threshold liability test. A threshold liability test,
after all, would apply only to products for which decisions are not
informed or rational. This exemption would not be appropriate for
the following three reasons. First, although it may be too costly to
provide effective hazard warnings, their absence does not necessar-
ily imply that there are no risks associated with the product.168 Sec-
ond, the requirements that are placed on hazard warnings are much
less than those that have been placed on a market to show that the
product was fully effective. Thus, one would want to tighten the
warnings requirements if a firm's ability to pass the hazard warnings
test implied that it would be exempt from liability. Consumers must
receive, fully understand, and act upon a warning for the market to
be efficient.1 69 Therefore, even a well-designed warning may not be
effective in informing consumers.170 Third, and perhaps most im-
portant, is that the tests are different. The warnings test previously
outlined is based on the producer's risk-utility of the product after
the warnings have been given in relationship to the producer's risk-
utility of the product before the warnings have been given. 171 In
contrast, the threshold marketing test is based on the purchaser's
risk-utility, which excludes profits from consideration.1 72 Addition-
ally, warnings might not enhance a product because of inadequate
consumer choice or extreme costliness of warnings, but a product,
nevertheless, may not be in the consumers' best interests. 1 3
health risks and health benefits. See PHYSICIANS DESK REFERENCE (43d ed. 1989) (providing
warnings, precautions, and adverse reactions associated with these products); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1977) (discussing unavoidably unsafe prod-
ucts). Comment k goes on to state that any product which involves a high degree of risk,
which is accompanied by a "proper directions and warnings" will not be declared "defective"
or "unreasonably dangerous." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k.
168. See Woodwill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 351-52, 374 N.E.2d 683, 685
(1978) (noting product may be defective due to inadequate warning), af'd, 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402
N.E.2d 194 (1988); see also Note, Strict Products Liability and the Risk-Utility Test for Design Defect:
An Economic Analysis, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 2045, 2046 n.3 (1984) (noting warnings cost nothing).
169. This is a basic assumption of perfect competition in economic models. See generally
W. ALBRECrr, ECONOMICS 39 (2d ed. 1979) (noting consumer ignorance is major cause for
market failure); LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supra note 99, at 1-12 (discussing tests and information
for hazard warning effectiveness and effect on purchase decisions).
170. See LEARNING ABoUT RISK, supra note 99, at 41 (noting placement and format of
warning does have effect on informing consumers of hazards).
171. See supra notes 131-53 and accompanying text (discussing private risk-utility measure
as applied to hazard warning context).
172. See supra notes 154-67 and accompanying text (discussing purchaser's risk-utility
measure as applied to threshold decision making context).
173. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text (discussing hazards of cigarettes and
liquor).
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IV. INFORMATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
Since the publication of Dean Wade's article, many have raised
the question as to who should apply the risk-utility test.174 One
could pose this question narrowly and simply ask whether it should
be in the judge's or the jury's domain.175 When limited to these
options, Wade indicates that it is the court that has the discretion of
whether to submit the issue to the jury.1 76 Such discretion stems
from the fact that risk-utility is considered a question of law and
policy-not issues of fact.' 77
One also can raise a more fundamental question as to whether the
courts, regulatory agencies, or Congress is best suited to undertake
the risk-utility analysis.' 78 This institutional question only gained
prominence with the emergence, in the 1970s, of various regulatory
agencies including: the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (OSHA), the United States Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion, and the United States Environmental Protection Agency. In
addition, Congress also has become increasingly active in the regu-
latory area over the past two decades, particularly with respect to
products that have attracted major public debate. 179 One such
product, cigarettes, has been the subject of extensive Congressional
examination and a series of increasingly stringent warning
requirements. 8 0
The issue of the division of labor between the courts, the federal
regulatory agencies, and Congress is also pertinent to establishing
the appropriate division of labor for the purposes of risk-utility mea-
174. See Note, supra note 168, at 2050-51 & n.28 (discussing methodology of court's im-
plementation of risk-utility test as using consumer standard of care); Wade, supra note 3, at
838-41 (discussing application of risk-utility analysis); see also K. ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 11-
13 (noting insurance law assists performing calculation of risks and costs in economically effi-
cient manner).
175. See Wade, supra note 3, at 838-41 (discussing judge's and jury's role in applying risk-
utility analysis).
176. Id. at 838; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 520 comment 1 (1977) (indicating
that determination of strict liability requires court's expertise due to fact it is "characteriza-
tion of defendant's activities or enterprise").
177. Wade, supra note 3, at 838.
178. See generally Viscusi, supra note 80, at 65 (discussing ability and efficiency of markets,
tort liability, social insurance, and regulation as carrying out risk utility analysis).
179. States have entered into this regulatory arena as well. See Viscusi, supra note 136, at
292-96 (discussing California's proposition 65, which sets labeling standards for consumer
products).
180. See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (codi-
fied as amended through scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988)) (diversifying
label requirements for cigarettes). Section 2 of the Act specifically calls for government dis-
semination of information concerning the hazards of smoking. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
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surement.18 1 If existing regulatory requirements lead to an efficient
level of safety for a product, then a risk-utility test in the courts be-
comes superfluous. In effect, the regulatory analysis supporting
these regulations would have already provided the answers to the
risk-utility test because they would have shown that the resulting
guidelines are efficient.18 2
The way in which one handles the regulatory compliance issue is
slightly complicated because not all regulations are equal in terms
of their stringency or their intent. For instance, a product that vio-
lates an agency's set of regulations, for instance, need not necessar-
ily reflect the appropriateness of the product's safety level. Instead,
such a determination may indicate the sparse coverage of the regu-
lations, or it may stem from the agency's inability to establish a spe-
cific provision governing the safety characteristics of the product.
Therefore, one need not necessarily conclude that the absence of a
violation implies that the product is acceptable or passes a risk-util-
ity test. This product simply may have escaped scrutiny by the regu-
latory agency, and such failure by the agency should not mean that
the court must ignore the product.
Another situation where regulatory compliance is not conclusive
of safety is that in which a product complies with insufficient govern-
ment regulations. Such regulations might not be adequate to en-
sure a level of safety so great that the product would pass a risk-
utility test with respect to alternative design changes or warnings.18 3
For example, hazard warnings that are in compliance with the
OSHA hazard communication standard may fail to be sufficient be-
cause the regulatory agency places very few guidelines upon these
181. See Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Divi-
sion of Labor, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 300, 301-03 (1988) (discussing interaction of design and
division of labor for regulation of risks).
182. In the case of cigarettes, volumes of analysis have been published regarding the po-
tential risks of cigarettes. See supra note 166 (listing various reports published by government
agencies regarding hazards of smoking); see also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT or HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE (1983)
(reporting effects of smoking on heart disease); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CANCER - A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL (1982) (reporting causal link between cancer and smoking); UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING FOR
WOMEN - A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1980) (reporting health effects of smoking
on women). For a discussion of congressional preemption of state common law, including
risk liability concerning cigarette manufacturers, see Cris & Marjoras, supra note 166, at 578-
82.
183. See Viscusi, supra note 181, at 300-01 (discussing regulatory compliance and liability
under tort law); see also Dowie, Pinto Madness, in CRISIS IN AM. INSTITUTIONS 22 U. Skolnick &
E. Currie 6th ed. 1985) (describing Ford Pinto's compliance with government and corporate
regulations and subsequent failure of product to guarantee safety).
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warnings. 18 4 In contrast, hazard warnings for cigarettes contain
wording that is mandated by Congress, and all hazard warnings for
pharmaceutical products are formally approved by the Food and
Drug Administration. 18 5 In the case of warnings that are explicitly
dictated by regulatory actions, the issue should be only whether the
producer withheld information from the agency that might have
been helpful in formulating a different warning. If this is not the
case, the producer should not be liable for any warnings-related risk
associated with the product.
A third possible situation is one in which the government regula-
tion creates a standard that goes beyond what would be required by
a risk-utility test. This situation occurs when explicit regulations are
in compliance with the mandate of the regulatory agency. More-
over, that is possible because the kinds of trade-offs embodied in a
risk-utility test are often not permitted under the legislation of the
regulatory agency. Congress, for example, has explicitly prohibited
OSHA from basing its regulations on benefit-cost grounds, and re-
quires it to follow a risk-oriented approach. 1 6 The Consumer
Product Safety Commission does examine the components related
to risk-utility analysis, but does not combine them in any explicit
manner or base its decisions entirely upon cost-benefit concepts.' 8 7
In order to reduce the institutional overlaps and avoid giving pro-
ducers conflicting guidelines for the regulation of their products, an
effort should be made to take advantage of the outcomes in the reg-
ulatory arena when assessing the desirability ofjudicial intervention.
Ultimately, regulatory agencies, instead of the courts, will exercise
authority over most of the major design and warning regulations
because these issues hinge on overall market performance, as op-
184. The federal standards regarding hazardous material were first authorized by the Oc-
cupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982). The Hazard Com-
munication Standard of the Act was promulgated by the Occupational Health and Safety
Administration (OSHA) in 1986. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1986); see also Note, The Extent of
OSHA Preemption of State Hazard Reporting Requirements, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 630, 631-32 (1988)
(providing brief description of regulatory system); O'Reilly, Risk ofAssumptions: Impacts of Reg-
ulatory Label Warnings Upon Industrial Products Liability, 37 CATH. U.L. REv. 85, 95-102 (1987)
(discussing effects of OSHA regulations on tort system of products liability).
185. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1988) (setting out exact wording to be placed on cigarette
packages); see also 21 U.S.C. § 353 (1988) (describing requirements for labeling drugs).
186. See Alternative Approaches, supra note 99, at 6-10 (describing methodology of OSHA
regulation promulgation); see also Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.
§ 651 (1976) (setting forth policy "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman
in the nation safe and healthy working conditions").
187. See Alternative Approaches, supra note 99, at 36-55 (discussing methodology, powers,
and mandate of Consumer Product Safety Commission). The Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission's mandate is to "protect the public against risks of injury associated with consumer
products." Consumer Product Safety Act, § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2051-2083 (1988)).
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posed to the idiosyncratic issues that would be involved in a particu-
lar case.188 Whether we reach that stage, however, depends on
whether the federal regulatory agencies continue to expand the
scope of their efforts. Until such a complete shifting of responsibili-
ties has been achieved, there should at least be greater recognition
of the interdependence of these institutions and the commonality of
their functions.' 8 9
The nature of the information required to undertake a risk-utility
assessment is routinely calculated as part of a regulatory analysis,
though it is certainly not the norm in court cases.' 90 It is quite com-
mon for economists and regulatory agencies to assess consumer de-
mand for a product, the effect on a producer's profits due to a
product change, the effect on the purchase price, and the injury
costs.1 91 In situations in which the extent of consumer knowledge is
not known, one could perform a sensitivity analysis to reveal how
the results of a risk-utility analysis would change. This analysis
could use, for example, the extreme situations in which there is no
consumer information and full consumer information regarding the
risks as points of reference.
In the usual instance, however, one would not attempt to pinpoint
each of these magnitudes that comprise a risk-utility calculation.' 92
This does not mean the risk-utility standard reduces to serving sim-
ply as a "metaphor." Rather, it provides a checklist that the courts
can use in framing their analysis about an issue.' 93 In the case of a
product design change, for example, the courts must ask whether
the improved safety benefits resulting from this change are justified
given the added costs.' 94 In many cases, simply recognizing the ap-
188. This is assuming, of course, that identical regulations would apply to all products for
which the regulations have been promulgated. It would appear that if this is not the case, the
courts would be the only forum to deal with individual risk-utility measurements.
189. But see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 23.5 (1972) (claiming neither legal
system nor government style of allocation of resources is efficient). It has also .been argued
that the market is not the most efficient institution to perform these calculations. See Viscusi,
supra note 80, at 74-75 (arguing "markets do not create strong incentives to generate risk
information").
190. For an example, see supra note 182 (listing reports compiled by Surgeon General on
smoking).
191. These are the four factors listed previously as the private risk-utility measure. See
supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text (describing private risk-utility measure).
192. If this were done, however, we could create a risk-utility/information curve for the
passage of the test. This could apply both to the hazard warnings as well as the threshold
marketing decision.
193. This checklist would be comprised of a variation of Dean Wade's seven factors, or
the private risk-utility measure factors, which includes the firm's profits or the costs to the
firm.
194. If the information requirements include hazard warnings on the product, the re-
duced demand will have an impact on the profits of the firm. See supra notes 137-43 and
accompanying text (discussing costs of hazard warnings to producers).
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propriate components to assess product liability is most important.
In other words, one must ask: What are the criteria that must be
used to evaluate liability?
Undertaking formal risk-utility tests, akin to those provided in
federal regulatory analyses, may appear to be a daunting task that
may pose insurmountable computational burdens. In practice, how-
ever, these tests are intended primarily to provide a checklist of the
factors that should be considered by the courts. A subjective assess-
ment of the factors or qualitative measures of their importance may
be the best that is achievable. Nevertheless, it is useful to have
guidelines regarding the set of pertinent concerns and how they
should be combined. 195 Moreover, when we recall that the risk-util-
ity test is simply a more elaborate negligence test, then the novelty
of the approach is less dramatic than may appear at first glance.19 6
CONCLUSION
The risk-utility test developed by Dean Wade has become increas-
ingly prevalent in products liability cases. In large part, the reliance
on this test reflects the kind of balancing of consumer and producer
interests needed to form any reliable economic judgment regarding
the inadequacies of a product. Consideration of safety improve-
ments and hazard warnings require that both producer and con-
sumer impacts be considered under what has been termed the
"private risk-utility test."' 97 The threshold decision of whether the
product should be marketed at all has been highly controversial, but
a test along these lines is legitimate if properly formulated.' 98 A
different risk-utility measure, or what has been termed the pur-
chaser's risk-utility test, is relevant in this instance. A test for the
marketability of a product within the context of products liability is
also quite appropriate. The general character of the proposed test
is that of a negligence standard formalized in precise economic
terms. Moreover, the information base used for this test is that at
the time the product was sold, thus rejecting the retroactive liability
approach of Beshada.
195. At the least, the guidelines will provide uniformity across all product defect/hazard
warning issues. Although all the components are not appropriate for each case, predictability
will be a result because of a standard checklist.
196. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text (discussing relationship of strict liabil-
ity to negligence standard).
197. ,See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text (discussing private risk-utility
measure).
198. Thus, the extension of the Wade test in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 NJ. 169, 183,
463 A.2d 298, 305 (1983) is appropriate. But see supra notes 12-13 (arguing O'Brien extension
is not proper).
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Overall, Wade's initial analysis of factors comprising the risk-util-
ity test established a new direction for courts' treatment of product
defect cases. Dean Wade's original article enunciated the original
basis for risk-utility analysis and outlined many of the considerations
that enter, but it did not organize these considerations in any sys-
tematic manner. For instance, its benefit and cost concerns are in-
termingled with specification of alternative types of tests to be
undertaken. Subsequent legal scholarship has done little to im-
prove upon this situation, as authors have occasionally suggested
other sets of factors to be considered, but did not bring to bear any
systematic conceptual framework for approaching the risk-utility
judgment in a sound manner. The courts likewise did not advance
the conceptualization of risk-utility analysis, although they did ex-
tend its domain to include the threshold decision of the marketabil-
ity of a product.
The original emphasis of risk-utility analysis on the need for bal-
anced decisions with respect to product liability is a correct and fun-
damental principle. Moreover, many traditional factors that have
been considered are legitimate, but they did not provide a frame-
work for comprehensive and consistent risk-utility judgments. The
development in this Article of a series of economic formulations of
the risk-utility test is intended to establish a sounder basis for a
products liability defect doctrine.
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